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MAPPING LEGAL RESEARCH
MATHIAS M. SIEMS* AND DAITHI´ MAC SI´THIGH**
ABSTRACT. This article aims to map the position of academic legal
research, using a distinction between “law as a practical discipline”, “law
as humanities” and “law as social sciences” as a conceptual framework.
Having explained this framework, we address both the “macro” and
“micro” level of legal research in the UK. For this purpose, we have
collected information on the position of all law schools within the
structure of their respective universities. We also introduce “ternary
plots” as a new way of explaining individual research preferences. Our
general result is that all three categories play a role within the context of
UK legal academia, though the relationship between the “macro” and
the “micro” level is not always straight-forward. We also provide
comparisons with the US and Germany and show that in all three
countries law as an academic tradition has been constantly evolving,
raising questions such as whether the UK could or should move further to
a social science model already dominant in the US.
KEYWORDS: Legal Scholarship; Legal Research; Universities; United
Kingdom
I. INTRODUCTION
What do you call a person who does research in law at a university? In
languages such as German there is one single clear word for it
(Rechtswissenschaftler) but in English the picture seems to be more
confused: are you an “academic lawyer”, a “legal scholar”, a “legal
researcher”, a “legal academic”, or even a “legal scientist”? All of these
terms are used more or less frequently,1 along with more general terms
like “law lecturer” and “law professor”. The preference for a particular
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Research, University of Cambridge. Address for correspondence: Durham Law School, Durham
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** Lecturer in Law, University of Edinburgh. We thank Oscar Alvarez Macotela, Martin Gelter,
Chris Hanretty, Morten Hviid, the participants of research seminars at the University of East
Anglia, Durham University and Erasmus University Rotterdam, and an anonymous reviewer
for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Address for correspondence: School of
Law, University of Edinburgh, Old College, South Bridge, Edinburgh EH8 9YL. Email:
Daithi.Mac.Sithigh@ed.ac.uk.
1 In Google Scholar “legal scholar” is the most popular term (34,200 hits) and “legal scientist” the
least popular one (594 hits) [search on 3 July 2012].
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term is not only of terminological importance but it indicates a sense of
belonging.2 For instance, calling yourself an academic lawyer may
emphasise the fact that you are primarily a lawyer, affiliating yourself
with solicitors, barristers and judges. Conversely, the other terms put
more emphasis on the university affiliation, but here there are further
differences as well. For instance, someone who researches law from a
historical perspective may want to be called a legal scholar, whereas
someone who empirically tests hypotheses in law may prefer terms such
as legal academic or legal (or social) scientist.3
In this article we use a conceptual framework of “law as a practical
discipline”, “law as humanities” and “law as social sciences” in order
to map legal research. The classification of legal research is of interest
for a variety of reasons.4 It may determine where law is located within
the often complex mix of faculties, schools and other subunits of
universities. Such disciplinary barriers can matter, for instance, for
whether and how legal scholars collaborate with other academics and
practicing lawyers and how future legal scholars are trained and
recruited. The question is also important as it can contribute towards
an appreciation of the dominant paradigm (if one exists): individual
academics may not want to be regarded as outsiders in their scholarly
community, and, more tangibly, they may feel induced to pursue the
type of research that funding agencies see as “relevant”, “acceptable”
or within their scope.5
Our article also fills a gap in the literature. While being aware of
the extensive previous writing about research methods in law,6 the
originality of this contribution lies both in the method of analysis
and in its discussion of the interplay between “macro” structures and
“micro” choices within which researchers operate. More specifically, in
Part III, we offer new insights in how at the “macro-level” law fits
within the modern university structure, research funding system and
the concept of broad disciplines. In particular, we have collected in-
formation on the position of all UK law schools within the structure of
their respective universities, which has not been done in the previous
literature; we also explain the reasons for drawing attention to this
data. Part IV on the “micro-level” presents a new way of explaining
individual research preferences, introducing and promoting the use of
“ternary plots”. We also address the relationship between individual
2 Similar, but focussed on teaching: Patricia Leighton, Tony Mortimer and Nicola Whatley,
Today’s Law Teachers: Lawyers or Academics? (London 1995).
3 But note Twining’s contention that even empirical legal studies is “qualitative” and “humanistic”:
William Twining, General Jurisprudence (Cambridge 2009), 259.
4 For details see III. and IV., below.
5 Richard Collier, “The Liberal Law School, the Restructured University and the Paradox of Socio-
Legal Studies” (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 475, 488 (referring to the RAEs).
6 See the references in the following Parts.
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academics and university structures in a comparative context. First,
however, the conceptual framework of this article will be explained.
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This article is based on a distinction between three types of legal
research: (i) a research tradition which emphasises law as a practical
discipline, and approaches which position law as an aspect of (ii) the
humanities or (iii) of the social sciences. This is not the only way of
classifying legal research,7 yet, for the purposes of this article it offers a
suitable conceptual framework for mapping legal research.
To clarify, these three categories should be seen as “ideal types” of
legal research that can potentially be applied to different legal systems.8
Thus, this Part outlines conceptions of how legal research can be
pursued, not a description of how this is done in a particular legal or
academic system. This rationale also explains the choice of our three
categories: as they refer to generic terms (“practical”, “humanities”,
“social sciences”); they enable us to map, in the subsequent parts, how
far institutions, individuals and legal cultures belong to one or more of
those categories.9
Law as a practical discipline can refer to research that is valuable for
legal practitioners in drafting contracts, advising clients and mediating
conflicts. It can also be closely related to the work of the courts.
According to Susan Bartie the aim of such research is to examine
the “internal puzzles raised by the judge’s reasoning process” and to
“unveil uniform principles”.10 Legal research is then about a compara-
tively value-free analysis of legal rules, with the effect that law is an
applied discipline where legal academics are “academic lawyers” who
share the ethics of practicing lawyers.11 This can be seen as beneficial
since practical research may fulfil an obligation, held jointly with
legal practice, to “serve the system of justice” through training future
practitioners and addressing important issues for the legal system.12
A possible weakness is that such academic lawyers may be “more
familiar with legal professionals than with their colleagues from other
7 For distinctions similar to the one of this article: Sanne Taekema, “Relative Autonomy: A
Characterisation of the Discipline of Law” in Bart van Kling and Sanne Taekema (eds.), Law and
Method: Interdisciplinary Research into Law (Tu¨bingen 2011), 33–53; Edward L. Rubin, “Law and
the Methodology of Law” [1997] Wisconsin Law Review 521. For different ones see, e.g.,
Christopher McCrudden, “Legal Research and the Social Sciences” (2006) 122 Law Quarterly
Review 632; Mathias Siems, “Legal Originality” (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 147.
8 For differences between legal systems see IV. A and C., below.
9 Of course, this also allows mixtures: see, eg, IV. A and B., below.
10 Susan Bartie, “The Lingering Core of Legal Scholarship” (2010) 30 Legal Studies 345, 348.
11 See Tony Becher, Academic Tribes and Territories, Intellectual Enquiry and the Cultures of
Disciplines (Milton Keynes 1989) 8, 30–1, 155.
12 Harry T. Edwards, “The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession” (1992) 91 Michigan Law Review 34, 38–9. See also Neil Duxbury, Jurists and Judges
(Oxford 2001) 43–5.
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faculties”, leaving the law school divided between the academic and
legal worlds.13
Following Peter Birks, practical legal research can be research
that “criticises, explains, corrects and directs legal doctrine”.14 Yet,
doctrinal legal research is not identical to practical legal research.
This can be seen in Mark Van Hoecke’s taxonomy where he identifies
legal doctrine “as a mainly hermeneutic discipline, with also empirical,
argumentative, logical and normative elements”.15 Some of these
elements have a practical dimension but they also go beyond it: for
instance, practitioners may have no interest in deep hermeneutical
questions but they are of core interest to scholars in humanities, to
which we now turn.
Frequent parallels are drawn between law and humanities and it has
even been said that “(t)ypically, the discipline of law is regarded as part
of the humanities”.16 This follows from the view that positive law is
composed of legal ought-propositions.17 Legal scholars are therefore
concerned with the understanding of these stipulations, i.e. the text of
the law and its underlying ideas, or, to use Peter Goodrich’s words,
“the origins of the discipline of legal science are to be sought in a
textual past”.18 This view relates this approach to legal scholarship to
interpretative disciplines such as history, philosophy, theology and
literature which are generally recognised as having a primary affiliation
with the humanities. In particular, claims are made as to the import-
ance of legal texts:
“(t)he law is not simply a set of forensic or procedural skills. It is a
vast body of knowledge, compounded of historical material,
modes of textual analysis and various philosophical concerns. It is
a formal inquiry into our behavior and ideals that proceeds
essentially through language. It is a humanistic study – both as a
body of material wrought of words and a set of analytic skills and
procedural claims involving linguistic mastery”.19
13 Notker Hammerstein and Dirk Hierbaut, “Social Sciences, History and Law” in Walter Ru¨egg
(ed.), A History of the University in Europe, Volume IV (Cambridge 2011) 371, 414. See also
William Twining, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (London 1994) 52 (distinguishing
between professional and academic models of law school).
14 Peter Birks, What are Law Schools For? (Oxford 1996). See also Peter Birks, “The Academic and
the Practitioner” (1998) 18 Legal Studies 397.
15 Mark Van Hoecke, “Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?” in Mark
Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research (Oxford 2011) 1 at 17. See also John Bell, “Legal
Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law”, in Van Hoecke, ibid., 155 at p. 157
(no bright line between descriptive and normative questions).
16 International Legal Centre (Committee on Legal Education in Developing Countries), Legal
Education in a Changing World (Uppsala: International Legal Centre, 1975), para 90. See also
Becher, above n. 11, at p. 2 (academic law as a “humanities related profession”).
17 The background is Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley 1967).
18 Peter Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis (Houndsmills
1987), 33. See also Peter Goodrich, Languages of Law: From Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks
(London 1990) (references to linguistics, philosophy, semiotics etc).
19 A. Bartlett Giamitti (1982), then President of Yale, quoted in Austin Sarat, “On the Margin:
Humanities and Law” (1998) 10 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 401, 407.
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Thus, according to this view, the main commonality of law and
disciplines of the humanities is that they have a shared interest in
hermeneutics.20 It is also possible to contrast law as humanities with the
view that law should be primarily a practical discipline. Though both
are interested in interpretation, the law-as-humanities scholar ap-
proaches the law with the pure aim of understanding, whereas the law as
practical-legal-research scholar is interested in how it may be applied in
practice.21 To illustrate, Austin Sarat supports the turn to humanities to
counter what he terms the “value-neutral and technocratic approach”
of professional legal education, suggesting that legal scholarship
should not be judged by its contribution to law practice and that it may
well ignore lawyering except as an object of inquiry.22
Turning now to our final category, law as a social science, we find a
similar scepticism about merely finding out how to apply the law in
practice. Treating law as a social science offers the opportunity to
challenge the usefulness of court decisions and pieces of legislation
from an external and often empirical perspective.23 Reference can also
be made to the common Enlightenment origins of legal systems and of
social research.24 Yet in order to discuss law as a social science more
closely, we must look at particular branches of the social sciences and
how they relate to legal scholarship.
For example, Richard Posner writes about “economists and
economics-minded lawyers, who view law as a social science”,25 con-
structing models of legal rules and evaluating their potential effect on
overall social welfare. A view of law as a branch of political science
would emphasise the way it exercises power and allocates resources.26
Furthermore, legal research may benefit from approaches associated
with sociology, and can be engaged with the empirical aspects of
the social sciences. For example, such research may challenge legal
doctrine by raising the question how and why judges actually decide
cases.27 A socio-legal scholar may also want to examine the “social
origins, social conditions of existence, and social consequences” of
legal ideas.28 This may extend to quantitative empirical legal research
20 Similar Taekema, above n. 7, at pp. 33–53.
21 For the distinction between applied and pure research see also below n 73.
22 Sarat, above n. 19, at pp. 403–4.
23 Geoffrey Samuel, “Is Law Really a Social Science? A View from Comparative Law” (2008) 67
Cambridge Law Journal 288. See also Bell, above n. 15, at pp. 159–160.
24 Sharyn Roach Anleu, Law and Social Change (London 2010), 248.
25 Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature (Cambridge, Mass. 1998), 6.
26 See Jack Stark, “Using Literature to Imagine Other Cultures” (1997) 44/1 Federal Lawyer 54, 56
(rejecting such an approach).
27 Prominently Jerome Frank, “Are Judges Human?” (1931) 80 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 17 and ibid., Courts on Trial (Princeton 1949).
28 Roger Cotterrell, Law’s Community (Oxford 1995), ix.
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that applies statistical and econometric methods in order to test
whether and how legal rules matter in the real world.29
Such empirical testing may have the aspiration to transform legal
research to a hard social science, aiming to replicate the methods of
natural sciences but in respect of social phenomena.30 A similar linkage
to natural sciences, such as biology, may be suggested if one wanted to
construct law as a non-contradictory all-inclusive system of legal
rules.31 It may even be argued that “like any human or life science we
cannot study parts of the law outside their organic context”.32 Yet,
overall, it is clear that natural scientists and legal scholars do not share
the same methods. Thus, for the purposes of this article, we call our
final category simply “law as a social science”, being aware that some
social scientists may themselves be inspired by the methods of the
natural sciences.33
III. MACRO-LEVEL: HOW DOES LAW FIT WITHIN THE
UNIVERSITY STRUCTURE?
Published and peer-reviewed legal scholarship typically takes place
in universities or other research institutions. Thus, this part examines
the legal research environment in the UK. The first section explains
that law schools have an ambiguous position within the structure
of universities. Subsequently, we provide a comparison with the way
how research councils and professional associations have dealt with
the classification problem of legal research. Finally, we discuss how
such affiliations matter, both in terms of practical consequences and
of wider implications regarding the role of disciplines and inter-
disciplinary collaborations.
A. Mapping law schools within UK universities
There is some degree of pluralism regarding university structures,
a matter which is within the control of an individual institution.
29 See, e.g., Robert M. Lawless, Jennifer K. Robbennolt, and Thomas S. Ulen, Empirical Methods in
Law (New York 2009); Mathias Siems, “Measuring the Immeasurable: How to Turn Law into
Numbers”, in Michael Faure and Jan Smits (eds.), Does Law Matter? On Law and Economic
Growth (Cambridge 2011), 115.
30 For the similarity between social and natural sciences in the Anglo-Saxon tradition see E. K.
Francis, “History and the Social Sciences: Some Reflections on the Re-Integration of Social
Science” (1951) The Review of Politics 354, 356–7 (contrasting it with the German distinction
between Naturwissenschaften, natural sciences, and Geisteswissenschaften, sciences of the mind).
31 Howard Schweber, “The ‘Science’ of Legal Science: The Model of the Natural Sciences in
Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education” (1999) 17 Law and History Review 421. See also
Twining, above n. 3, at 260 (on whether an empirical science of law is possible). A related view –
though closer to humanities – is that of law as a logical discipline. See Julius Moo´r, “Das Logische
im Recht” (1927–28) Revue Internationale de la The´orie du Droit 157; Ulrich Klug, Juristische
Logik, 4th ed. (Berlin 1982).
32 Bell, above n. 15, at p.161 (referring to the institutional character of the law).
33 However, some may aim for a closer connection to humanities, e.g., Philip Selznick, A Humanist
Science: Values and Ideals in Social Inquiry (Stanford 2008).
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For example, some institutions have a “flat” structure with a high
number of single-discipline schools or departments, whereas others
have implemented an intermediate structure of faculties, divisions or
colleges. Further distinctions exist according to the precise allocation
of responsibilities between the university, the faculty and the school
level.34
For the purpose of this article, we have examined all 99 UK
universities in which academic units for law (schools or departments)
are found.35 As far as there exists an intermediate level, some
universities have a joined faculty of social sciences and humanities
(and/or arts), whereas others have separate faculties. There are
also some universities with idiosyncratic faculty structures which we
classified as “others”.36
Figure 1 reports our general results. It can be seen that a wide range
of models are used, and that rather than a clean division between law as
humanities on the one hand, and law as social science on the other, 33%
of all institutions either treat law as a unit of its own, potentially
reflecting its sui generis character, or have already put humanities and
social science together as one faculty, therefore avoiding a need to
specify whether law is properly affiliated with humanities or with social
science. Interestingly, a number of institutions include law in an
academic unit of business or management, or a faculty of business and
Figure 1: Position of Law School within Faculty Structure (n=99)
34 For this point see also III C, below.
35 The dataset, with further explanations, is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2097698.
36 For instance, Southampton Solent’s Faculty of Business, Sport and Enterprise, or the University
of Gloucestershire’s Faculty of Business, Education and Professional Studies.
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law (or, vice versa). In this respect it is helpful to distinguish between
the approaches of so-called “mission groups”, i.e. the Russell Group,
1994 Group, University Alliance, and Million+.37
Figure 2 shows that the allocation of law to business schools is
concentrated in the University Alliance and the ex-polytechnic
Million+ institutions. The 1994 Group of smaller research-intensive
universities is the group that has the highest proportion of law schools
belonging to a faculty of social sciences. In the larger and older
research-intensive Russell Group institutions law is frequently a faculty
or school not belonging to an intermediate unit, and there are also two
instances where it belongs to a faculty of humanities.
What explains these diverse classifications? According to Donald
Campbell, writing about disciplinary distinctions in general, the
“present organization of content into departments is highly arbitrary,
a product in large part of historical accident”.38 Thus, it is useful
to outline the emergence and development of law schools in UK
universities. Traditionally, English lawyers were not trained at univer-
sity but in an apprenticeship system.39 Law was seen as “a practical
Figure 2: Position of Law School within Faculty Structure in Different University
Groups (n=99)
37 University Groups at http://www.ucas.com/students/wheretostart/heexplained/universitygroups.
It should be noted that during the time that this article was prepared, some movement between
groups was in progress. The data is based on the membership of the groups as of 1 August 2012
but further change is not unlikely.
38 Donald T. Campbell, “Ethnocentrism of Disciplines and the Fish-Scale Model of Omniscience” in
Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn Sherif (eds.), Interdisciplinary Relationships in the Social Sciences
(Chicago 1969) 3, 8.
39 See J. H. Baker, The Third University of England: The Inns of Court and the Common-Law
Tradition (London 1990); Jonathan A. Bush and Alain A. Wijffels, Learning the Law: Teaching
and the Transmission of Law in England, 1150–1900 (Cambridge 1999).
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subject which can only be learnt by practice and not by systematic,
scholarly instruction”.40
Although from their earliest days Oxford and Cambridge taught
some Roman law,41 and Oxford established the Vinerian Professorship
of Common Law in 1758, it was only in the early 19th century that the
significant development of legal education began. This process led to
the development of law schools similar to those currently in operation.
The first “modern English law school” is said to have been established
at University College London (UCL) in 1826, though this was initially
not very successful with only three graduates with a degree in English
law in 1839.42 Thus, despite this innovation, in 1846 a Select Committee
of the House of Commons felt the need to inquire into the state of legal
education in England and Ireland. Its main recommendation was that:
The universities should teach law and should give degrees in
the subject, but the legal education given by them should be
‘comparative and philosophical’ in character, whereas the Inns
of Courts and the Law Society should establish a system of
professional education.43
Thus, at its origins, there was a close link to a field of humanities –
philosophy – not legal practice. This is also reflected in the fact that in
1850 the first law school of the University of Oxford was a School of
Law and Modern History, which only became a separate “final honour
school of Jurisprudence” in 1872.44 Still, the 19th century also saw a
tendency towards making legal education more relevant for legal
practice since Roman law teaching was gradually supplemented and
replaced by English law.45
In the 18th century, Scottish universities (under the influence of
continental European ideas) developed an earlier interest in “scientific”
legal thinking.46 Yet, in Scotland too, more extensive university-based
teaching of law only started in the 19th century. Initially, the approach
to teaching was mainly “philosophical”, although the University of
Edinburgh began to offer a course in conveyancing in 1825.47 In 1864
40 J.W. Bridge, “The Academic Lawyer: Mere Working Mason or Architect?” (1975) 91 Law
Quarterly Review 488, 490. See also Albert Venn Dicey, Can English Law Be Taught At The
Universities? (London 1883).
41 See Christopher N. L. Brooke, A History of the University of Cambridge, Volume IV 1870–1900
(Cambridge 1993), 216 (since 13th century).
42 Twining, above n. 13, at p. 25.
43 Cited in Barry Nicholas, “Jurisprudence” in M. G. Brock and M. C. Curthoys (eds.), The History
of the University of Oxford, Volume VII: Nineteenth-Century Oxford, Part 2 (Oxford 2000), 385 at
p. 385.
44 Nicholas, above n. 43, at 385, 389. See also Frederick Henry Lawson, The Oxford Law School,
1850–1965 (Oxford 1968); Duxbury, above n. 12, at p. 70 (for Oxford and Cambridge).
45 See Brooke, above n. 41, at p. 216 (for Cambridge).
46 See John W. Cairns, “The Origins of the Edinburgh Law School: the Union of 1707 and the
Regius Chair” (2007) 11 Edinburgh Law Review 300.
47 See Robert D. Anderson, Michael Lynch and Nicholas Philipson, The University of Edinburgh
(Edinburgh 2003), 97.
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Edinburgh introduced an LL.B. degree to encourage “academic
studies of law”, and it appointed James Lorimer to the vacant chair of
public law. Robert Anderson and colleagues describe the situation as
follows:
Lorimer believed that law should be a scholarly and liberal study,
not just a training for practitioners, and he argued that an
expanded legal education could give a broad preparation, as in
continental countries, for public service, diplomacy, journals and
similar careers. But this idea never caught on in Britain. The LL.B.
proved too advanced to attract more than a handful of candidates
(…).48
Thus, both in England and Scotland we observe a similar tension
between legal practice and law as humanities at the very origins of law
faculties. The next hundred years saw the emergence of social sciences
as an academic field,49 as well as the establishment of the “red brick”,
“glass plate” and modern universities, sometimes with newer structures
going beyond departments and disciplines.50 There was also the trend to
expand university legal education. This followed a growing demand for
lawyers but also demonstrated that the trend to make law a subject that
can be studied at university was continuing.51
As far as the structural position of law within the university is
concerned, however, in the early 1990s most UK universities still had a
relatively “flat” structure, with law being a separate faculty and not
part of an intermediate unit.52 Thus, the integration of law schools into
joined faculties has mainly been a development of the last twenty
years.53 The main reason why universities have moved towards inter-
mediate faculties, combining various schools, has been the desire to
save costs, for instance, by way of centralising administrative tasks and
building “critical mass”.54 From a critical perspective, this has been
explained as a trend towards a restructured, corporatised and en-
trepreneurial university, aiming to contribute to the “knowledge
economy”.55 There have also been concerns that the humanities have
48 Anderson et al, above n. 47, at 124.
49 See Asa Briggs, “History and the Social Sciences” in Walter Ru¨egg (ed.), A History of the
University in Europe, Volume III (Cambridge 2004) 459, 479.
50 Malcolm Tight, The Development of Higher Education in the United Kingdom Since 1945
(Maidenhead 2009) 100.
51 See Twining, above n. 13, at 25–42.
52 See International Association of Universities, International Handbook of Universities (13th ed.,
1993), 900–942.
53 This point is made in general terms by Mary Kenkel, “Policy Change and The Challenge to
Academic Identities” in Jurgen Enders and Egbert de Weert (eds.), The Changing Face of
Academic Life: Analytical and Comparative Perspectives (London 2009), 78, 87.
54 Mary Henkel, Academic Identities and Policy Change in Higher Education (London 2000), 57.
55 See, eg, Richard Collier “‘We’re All Socio-Legal Now?’ Legal Education, Scholarship and the
‘Global Knowledge Economy’ – Reflections on the UK Experience” (2004) 26 Sydney Law
Review 503.
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become marginalised because, allegedly, they do not provide clear
economic returns to society.56
These considerations may be most clearly seen in the universities of
Million+ and the University Alliance. They often have a general focus
on practical and business-oriented education.57 Typically, they also
have relatively small law units: thus, there can be a valid case of
“critical mass” in combining law and business. This contrasts with the
relative conservatism of the universities of the Russell Group where a
high proportion of law schools stand as independent academic units
with a direct relationship with the university. Yet there is no easy
answer to the question why in these and other universities law has
become part of a faculty of social sciences or a faculty of humanities or
a joined faculty. To some extent, the age of universities may play a role
because older universities may have already had a faculty of humanities
before social sciences became popular in the 20th century,58 but other
factors, such as the size, structure and focus of the specific university,
are also likely to matter, alongside the research methods employed by
legal academics, as considered below.
B. Comparison with external classifications
In addition to universities, organisations such as research councils and
professional associations have been faced with the question of how to
classify law. Research councils in the UK now cover the complete
academic landscape, albeit with a recognition that there may be some
issues at the boundaries between two or more councils.59 For an
individual academic unit the councils are important sources of income
and of recognition, and are a distinct source of policy and of funding
(i.e. alongside HEFCE and similar agencies in Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland, which are responsible for the REF (Research
Excellence Framework)60 and for QR (quality-related) research fund-
ing). Law is one of the disciplines that causes difficulty as to which
council should fund a given project, with the main councils in question
being the Arts & Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and the
56 For a recent defence of humanities Stefan Collini, What Are Universities For? (London 2012);
similarly Anthony T. Kronman, Education’s End (New Haven 2007) and John Henry Newman,
The Idea of a University (London 1852). For legal education see also Anthony Bradney,
Conversations, Choices and Chances: The Liberal Law School in the Twenty-first Century (Oxford
2003).
57 Henkel, above n. 54, at p. 32.
58 For this point see Gabriele Griffin, PamMedhurst and Trish Green, Disciplinary Barriers between
the Social Sciences and Humanities, National Report on the UK, January 2005, available at http://
www.york.ac.uk/res/researchintegration/National_Report_UK.pdf, at 16.
59 See also http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/research/xrcprogrammes/Pages/home.aspx (for funding of “cross-
council research”); a recent example (with law as a key component) is the funding of the Centre for
Creativity, Regulation, Enterprise & Technology by the AHRC, ESRC and EPSRC: http://
www.create.ac.uk.
60 Formerly, the RAE. See http://www.hefce.ac.uk/research/ref/.
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Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)61. By way of clarifi-
cation, the councils have stated that:
The AHRC supports research into the content, procedures,
theory, philosophy and history of the law. This includes studies of
legal systems and legislation in all periods of history and in all
parts of the world. ESRC supports socio-legal studies, which are
concerned with the social, political and economic influences on
and impact of the law and the legal system.62
The statement in which this passage appears also considers other
borderline disciplines, including area studies, education, linguistics,
cultural and media studies, and even history. Nonetheless, it does not
explain what the basis of distinction is, such as, the research methods
employed, the scope of the research, or other points of differentiation.
Looking a little closer, it can be observed that the AHRC includes law
in a review panel (Panel A) alongside history, philosophy and religion,
while the ESRC includes “Social Legal” in a panel with sociology,
political studies and anthropology, to name but a few.63
Many disciplines are also represented by a learned society or pro-
fessional association of some description.64 As well as organising con-
ferences, circulating news bulletins and issuing public statements, these
organisations are called upon to represent the interests of the discipline,
including for the nomination of peer reviewers for the REF. Law,
however, has not one but three such associations, as well as a now-
defunct Centre for Legal Education (formerly funded by the Higher
Education Academy) and an association of Heads of School, CHULS.
The three associations are the Society of Legal Scholars,
the Association of Law Teachers, and the Socio-Legal Studies
Association. The first two are different because the SLS once limited
membership to scholars at established universities (thus excluding the
former polytechnic institutions), so the ALT catered to the ineligible
scholars. However, both organisations now welcome members from all
institutions.65 The SLSA presents a particularly interesting study for
this article. It describes socio-legal research as:
embrac(ing) disciplines and subjects concerned with law as a
social institution, with the social effects of law, legal processes,
61 Previously called the Social Science Research Council (SSRC). For its history see Robert Lee,
“Socio-Legal Research – What’s the Use?”, in Philip A. Thomas, Socio-Legal Studies (Aldershot
1997) 76.
62 AHRC/ESRC Joint Statement, available at http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/FundingOpportunities/Pages/
Subjectstatement.aspx
63 Interaction with research councils has been identified as a key aspect of discipline formation and
identity, despite the autonomy of universities regarding the recognition or configuration of
disciplines and academic units: Griffin et al., above n. 58.
64 On the importance of the learned society in the construction of the discipline, see Henkel, above
n. 54, at p. 189.
65 More generally on the history of the SLS see Fiona Cownie and Raymond Cocks, ‘A Great and
Noble Occupation!’: The History of the Society of Legal Scholars (Oxford 2009).
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institutions and services and with the influence of social, political
and economic factors on the law and legal institutions, (…)
covering a range of theoretical perspectives and a wide range of
empirical research and methodologies.66
It is therefore apparent that, comparing the position of law within
university structures with the external classifications of research coun-
cils and professional associations, only the latter organisations respond
to the ambiguous status of law by purporting to split it into two parts –
although what the two parts are is not the same between the councils
and the associations, and many scholars join more than one association
or apply to both research councils. This may demonstrate that, in
principle, it is possible to develop substantive (albeit fairly generic)
criteria for such a distinction.67 Nonetheless, no UK university has
attempted splitting law into two (or three) separate schools68 while there
are examples of law units dividing along other lines in Japan and
Canada.69 This raises the question about the relevance of the internal
university structure for legal research, as there are competing influences
on the self-identification of an individual researcher.
C. The influence of university structures on legal research
The trend towards intermediate faculties, combining various schools,
has been driven in part by the desire to save costs.70 Yet, internal
university structures do not only matter in financial terms. In the
following we distinguish between more practical and more abstract
aspects, while also indicating how problems may be overcome.
First, such structures can have practical consequences for the
research that academics pursue. For instance, if in its integration into a
faculty of social sciences the law school is re-located within a joined
faculty building, this may foster communication with academics from
the other schools. There can also be linkages between financial in-
centives and collaboration across disciplines. For example, if it is as-
sumed that fields such as business studies are better able to generate
income than humanities, this may lead to research collaborations on
66 SLSA Statement, also available at www.kent.ac.uk/nslsa/images/slsadownloads/slsaexec/
minutes%2520slsa%2520e%252014.01.2010.doc.
67 But for the problems of defining “socio-legal” see, e.g., Philip A. Thomas, “Socio-Legal Studies:
The Case of Disappearing Fleas and Bustards” in Philip A. Thomas, Socio-Legal Studies
(Aldershot 1997) 1.
68 Though law schools may consist of separate departments (e.g., the School of Law at Queen Mary,
University of London, consisting of the Department of Law and the Centre for Commercial Law
Studies).
69 For Japan see Setsuo Miyazawa, Kay-Wah Chan and Ilhyung Lee, “The Reform of Legal
Education in Asia” (2008) 4 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 333 (division between
undergraduate law faculties and postgraduate US-style law schools). For Canada see the two
“sections” of the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Law: http://www.commonlaw.uottawa.ca and
http://www.droitcivil.uottawa.ca/ (both of which are bilingual).
70 See Section A above.
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topics such as law & finance, while reducing “the exploration of life’s
mystery and meaning”71. The institutional arrangements of a higher
education institution can also affect research more directly. Research
training may be provided to doctoral students at a faculty-wide level,
something which is fostered by the ESRC funding of doctoral training
centres.72 Often there are research offices at the faculty level. Here, it is
not unrealistic to assume that a faculty research office located in a
faculty of social sciences may advise legal academics quite differently
on topics such as good research (in terms of RAE/REF) and research
grants than a research office located in humanities.
Second, university structures influence the status and self-
identification of academics. It has been said that there are different
“academic tribes and territories” closely associated with identity
and accounting for disciplinary barriers between social sciences and
humanities, or more generally hard and soft disciplines and pure and
applied ones.73 Thus, if law is housed in a faculty of social sciences or a
business school, an academic like Gary Watt, who is interested in
“the soul or humanity of law”, may understandably say that such
a “marriage between law and the humanities (is) something of a
forbidden love”.74
Of course, the benefits of collaboration between law and other
disciplines are often emphasised. Transgressing disciplinary boundaries
has been described as a rebellious, or even romantic, activity in the
service of a greater truth.75 Yet, this is easier said than done. Academic
disciplines may be “intellectual silos”,76 or tribes employing “devices
geared to the exclusion of illegal immigrants”.77 This is partly blamed
on the way universities are structured: according to Becher, “if inter-
disciplinary specialisation is required in order to develop an inno-
vation, the organisation of university departments often inhibits it”.78
Specifically with respect to law, there is the further complexity of
the relationship to legal practice. Thus, from the perspective of the law
71 Kronman, above n. 56, at p. 6.
72 Accredited Doctoral Training Centres, available at http://www.esrc.ac.uk/funding-and-guidance/
guidance/postgraduates/doctoral-training-centres.aspx.
73 See Becher, above n. 11, at p. 151; Griffin et al., above n. 58; Sheldon Rothblatt, “Curriculum,
Students, Education” in Walter Ru¨egg (ed.), A History of the University in Europe, Volume IV,
238, 245.
74 Gary Watt, “The Soul of Legal Education” (2006) 3 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues, at
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2006/issue3/watt3.html
75 Jack M. Balkin, “Interdisciplinarity as Colonization” (1996) 53 Washington and Lee Law Review
949, 957. See also Douglas W. Vick, “Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law” (2004) 31
Journal of Law and Society 163; Mathias M. Siems, “The Taxonomy of Interdisciplinary Legal
Research: Finding the Way Out of the Desert” (2009) 7 Journal of Commonwealth Law and Legal
Education 5.
76 See Dame Hazel Genn, Martin Partington and Sally Wheeler, Law in the Real World: Improving
Our Understanding of How Law Works: Final Report and Recommendation (London 2006) 2.
77 Becher, above n. 11, at p. 24.
78 Becher, above n. 11, at p. 136.
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school, the problem may be that it has “two masters” since, at least, it
has to coordinate with professional bodies in terms of teaching as well
as the normal internal requirements of a university.79 From the per-
spective of the legal profession it may be seen as a problem that it has to
“compete (…) with other disciplines in the university for the attention
of legal scholars”.80 It has therefore be observed that there are ongoing
tensions between university law schools and the legal profession on the
respective roles of each, while the quality of the common law may
depend on a strong relationship between legal scholars and judges.81
There is also the apparent risk of a bifurcation between teaching and
research, because taking account what is of interest for legal practice
may be more important for the former than for the latter.82
To foster collaboration within universities, a possible way forward
may be to move away from the focus on monolithic and self-contained
disciplines, schools and faculties.83 Rather, there may be chains and
networks of mutual appreciations,84 and a sliding scale of similarities
ranging from some shared ground to trade relations to common
frontiers.85 More specifically, it has been suggested to shift from “dis-
ciplines” to “specialisations”. These specialisations would retain the
benefit of division of labour, but they could be structured more
flexibly, for instance, in being grouped according to theories, methods
or subject matter specialities.86
In the UK, this is not merely an idea. At various universities there
are interdisciplinary centres between law and (other) fields of social
sciences or humanities, as well as between law schools and legal
practice,87 thus, again, showing the ambiguity of law’s intellectual
position. However, the RAE and REF has relied on a “unit of assess-
ment” approach, which may encourage institutions to design academic
79 See Tim Vollans, “The Law School with two Masters?” (2008) 2 Web Journal of Current Legal
Issues, available at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2008/issue2/vollans2.html.
80 Janet Gail Donald, “The Commons: Disciplinary and Interdisciplinary Encounters” in Carolin
Kreber (ed.), The University and its Disciplines: Teaching and Learning Within and Beyond
Disciplinary Boundaries (Abingdon 2009) 35, 41.
81 For the first point see Fiona Cownie, “Contextualising Stakeholders in the Law School” in Fiona
Cownie (ed.), Stakeholders in the Law School (Oxford 2010) 1, 9. For the second one Alexandra
Braun, “Professors and Judges in Italy: It Takes Two to Tango” (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 665, 666–670.
82 Collie, above n. 55 at p. 530. See also Thomas, above n. 67, at p. 17 (most legal scholars try to link
their fields of teaching and research, according to a survey).
83 On the challenge to the discipline as the “primary form of epistemological organisation for the
development and regulation of advanced knowledge”, see Kenkel, above n. 53, at 85. See also
Geoffrey Lockwood, ‘Management and Resources’, in Walter Ru¨egg (ed.), A History of the
University in Europe, Volume IV, 124, 131.
84 Michael Polanyi, “The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory” (1962) 1
Minerva 54.
85 Becher, above n. 11, at p. 36.
86 See Becher, above n. 11, at pp. 44–48.
87 See, e.g., http://www.uea.ac.uk/ccp, http://www.bbk.ac.uk/law/our-research/centre-for-law-and-
the-humanities, and http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/depts/lgir/research-centres/centre-for-family-
law-and-practice/.
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units that match REF units,88 and law remains a discrete unit of
assessment for the forthcoming REF 2014.
IV. MICRO-LEVEL: IDENTIFYING PREFERENCES OF LEGAL ACADEMICS
Legal research is subject to a range of competing influences. These
concern the university structures, research councils and professional
associations, discussed in the previous part, as well as other factors,
such as the influence of heads of schools and other senior academics in
steering early career colleagues in a particular direction. Yet, the indi-
vidual researcher is not wholly dependent on these structures. It is
therefore also necessary to identify more precisely how at the “micro-
level” individual legal academics respond to the perspectives of law as a
practical discipline, law as humanities, and law as social sciences. The
first section of this part outlines previous research on this issue.
Subsequently, we suggest that a ternary plot can be a useful conceptual
tool to show individual, and often mixed, preferences of legal
academics. Finally, we use such a plot to compare (based on literature)
the development of UK legal scholarship with that in the US and
Germany, also returning to the relationship between the macro-
and micro-level (faculty structure compared with the preferences of
individual academics), and consider possible future paths for the UK.
A. Studies on the affinity of contemporary legal research
This article is not the first one which tries to identify the predominant
approach to current legal research. There are different ways how this
question can be approached. To illustrate, three examples (from
England, the US and the Netherlands) will be provided.
Based on interviews, Fiona Cownie examined the culture and
identity of legal academics at English universities. In her approach she
was inspired by Tony Becher’s book on academic tribes and territories
which explored the linkages between academic cultures (“tribes”) and
disciplinary knowledge (“territories”) in twelve academic disciplines.89
One chapter of Cownie’s book deals with the preferred research
methods of legal scholars, distinguishing between black-letter law,
socio-legal studies, critical legal studies, and legal feminism.90 Her main
finding is that about half of the respondents described themselves as
black-letter lawyers and the other half as belonging to one of the other
approaches. Cownie also reports that many academics mix approaches,
and that there is a gradual move away from pure black-letter law.
88 Henkel, above n. 54, at p. 122.
89 Becher, above n. 11. See now also Tony Becher and Paul Trowler,Academic Tribes and Territories:
Intellectual Enquiry and the Culture of Disciplines 2nd edn, (Buckingham 2001).
90 Fiona Cownie, Legal Academics (Oxford 2004) 49–72.
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Furthermore, Cownie finds that the shift of research paradigms is
not without problems. The desire to engage with more interdisciplinary
work is often challenged by the way lawyers are trained in the
British tradition.91 With respect to the output of their research, some
academics regret that the Research Assessment Exercises (RAEs) have
meant that descriptive research, such as publications and textbooks in-
tended for use by legal practitioners, are increasingly regarded as second
rank activity.92 Overall, Cownie observes that legal academics are
somewhere in a no man’s land, with minimal contact with academics
from other disciplines and with members of the legal profession.93
Robert Ellickson took a different approach; his work includes a
statistical analysis of US law review articles, for the purpose of
examining the use of particular legal methods between 1982 and 1996.94
A much wider range of methods were analysed, namely doctrinal, law
& economics, critical, postmodern, feminist, empirical, socio-legal,
historical, psychological, philosophical and civic republicanism. In
order to establish the prevalence of these methods, key words or
phrases were used as proxies. Ellickson’s main finding was that there
has been only little decline in doctrinal analysis, a modest rise in
law and economics, and a boom and subsequent bust in critical ap-
proaches. He also examined the mainstream journals of the five leading
law schools (Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Stanford, and Yale) but the
results were very similar.
Ellickson comments that the stable ratio between doctrinal research
on the one hand and law and economics on the other may be regarded
as a surprise. There is no denying that law and economics has gained in
significance from the 1960s to the early 1980s.95 Yet, even in the inter-
disciplinary climate of US legal scholarship, practical legal research
remains a significant player. Thus, the complaint raised by judge
Harry Edwards that academics of US elite law schools are intrinsically
disdainful of the practice of law96 seems to be an exaggeration.
A quantitative approach is also used by Herve´ Tijssen in examining
the approaches of 90 Dutch law PhD theses.97 In particular, Tijssen was
91 Ibid., at p. 66.
92 Ibid., at p. 136. See also Fiona Cownie, “The Death of the Textbook Tradition” (2006) 3
European Journal of Legal Education 79.
93 Cownie, above n. 90, at p. 198. In addition, there is the risk of factional disputes see also ibid, at
p. 59 (“The existence of those fundamentally different approaches to law clearly brings with it the
possibility of conflict between legal academics, of a kind which is not unknown to law schools.”).
94 Robert C. Ellickson, “Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study” (2000) 29 Journal of Legal
Studies 517.
95 See William Landes and Richard Posner, “Heavily Cited Articles in Law” (1996) 71 Chicago-Kent
Law Review 825; Richard Posner, “The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962–
1987” (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 761.
96 Edwards, above n. 12, at p. 35.
97 Herve´ Tijssen, De Juridische Dissertatie Onder de Loep: De Verantwoording van Methodologische
Keuzes in Juridische Dissertaties (PhD Thesis Tilburg, 2009), available at http://arno.uvt.nl/
show.cgi?fid=94878.
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interested in how well the authors justify their research problem, the
selected sources and the methods used. With respect to methods, his
main criteria are document analysis, historical study, other types of
desk research, interviews, questionnaires and experiments. The overall
result is that most of the PhD theses explain the research problem but
do not justify the sources selected and the methods used in sufficient
detail.98 Tijssen also shows that a number of interesting distinctions can
be drawn. Empirical research is better in justifying its method and
sources than what he terms “classical” legal research. Similarly, dis-
tinguishing between five fields of study, interdisciplinary theses provide
better justifications than theses on private law, public law, criminal law
and international law. As far as authors use comparative methods, the
choice of countries but not the method of comparative analysis tends to
be sufficiently explained.
Cownie, Ellickson and Tijssen use classifications of research
methods which are not identical to the three main categories of this
article;99 yet, overall, they confirm our approach since many of the
former classifications can be regarded as sub-categories of our main
categories: for instance, law and economics, socio-legal and empirical
legal studies are part of law as social science; critical, post-modern or
historical approaches would typically belong to law as humanities;
and – in the context of a civil law tradition – “classical” legal research
incorporates practical and humanities-related aspects100.
However, a problem with these three studies can be observed: legal
academics often tend to mix approaches. For instance, it is not un-
common that a legal researcher starts with an historical introduction,
then turns to an analysis of the relevant case law and finally engages
with socio-political considerations. The following section presents a
conceptual tool that allows for this problem to be addressed.
B. Showing preferences with a ternary plot
The Cartesian coordinate system (with X and Y axes) works well when
only two variables are of interest. When there are three variables, it is
possible to plot them on a three dimensional Cartesian coordinate
system; yet, it is difficult to visualise the precise values of the third
dimension on a two-dimensional object such as a piece of paper or a
computer screen. Thus, when the values of the three variables add up to
100%, a ternary plot (also called a Finetti diagram) is a better tool to
show the relationship between the three components.
98 Similar, for UK scholarship, McCrudden, above n. 7, at p. 646: “legal academics, in my experience
at least, seldom appear to talk about methodology in the context of their research, whereas other
social scientists often place particular importance on methodological issues”.
99 See Part II above.
100 For Germany, see Section C below.
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Ternary plots are relatively common for scientific observations
(e.g., the relative presence of three elements in a sample) and they are
occasionally also found in other disciplines.101 With respect to law,
few examples are available, including an article by Ugo Mattei who
suggests that legal systems can be plotted on such a diagram in terms
of their affinity to representing the rule of traditional, political and
professional law,102 and a book by Werner Menski where the diagram
illustrates the relationship between state, society and ethics.103
We propose that a ternary plot can be used to show the “balance”
between the three approaches we and others have suggested are the
main categories of legal research. Figure 3 provides an example of how
a ternary plot can visualise how far legal academics are more inclined to
practical legal research, law as humanities, or law as social sciences.
A corner point represents 100% at the category in question, with the
line opposite the point representing 0%. For instance, someone who
regards himself as belonging 80% to law as social science and 20% to
practical legal research, would be plotted at the cross between the 80%
social science line, the 20% practical legal research line, and the 0%
humanities line. Someone whose interests are equally split would be at
Figure 3: Ternary Plot Showing Individual Research Preferences
101 David Cesarini et al, “Heritability of Cooperative Behavior in the Trust Game” (2008) 105 PNAS
3721–3726 (on genetic, shared environment and unshared environment in the context of trust).
102 Ugo Mattei, “Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems”
(1997) 45 American Journal of Comparative Law 5, 44.
103 Werner Menski, Comparative Law in a Global Context 2nd ed. (Cambridge 2006), 185.
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the centre of the triangle. Figure 3 also includes a reverse smaller
triangle inside the larger one. The borders of this triangle are the three
50% lines. Thus, being inside this inner triangle shows someone with
mixed research methods since none of the three approaches reaches the
overall majority.
In contemporary UK legal academia most scholars fall within this
inner triangle. At its very origins, of course, English law (and, for most
parts, Scots law) evolved as a practical discipline outside universities,
and as such would fall close to the point A in Figure 3. But this
gradually changed in the late 19th and early 20th century.104 Here, the
dominant paradigm was initially that of “exposition, conceptualisa-
tion, systematisation and analysis of existing legal doctrine”.105 This
moved legal scholarship into the direction of humanities,106 for instance
closer to point B, though also keeping a practical dimension to legal
scholarship and teaching.107 But since the early 1960s the social sciences
also had an impact on UK legal scholarship. The emergence of socio-
logical, socio-legal and other interdisciplinary forms of legal research
has been well documented.108 Of course, there has also been resistance:
The centrality of private-law, legal doctrine, courts and cases was
strenuously defended for its practical and educational virtues, and
for its objectivity, and it was claimed that the development of the
social sciences threatened objectivity and law’s singular claims to
respect.109
All this means that today legal scholarship in the UK can be positioned
as in-between the three categories, around point C in Figure 3. For
example, conceptual research by Christopher McCrudden and William
Twining found that “legal research now embraces a pluralism of
methodological approaches” and that “(t)oday, academic law is plur-
alistic, involving a bewildering diversity of subject-matters, perspec-
tives, objectives and methods”.110 Empirical research points in the same
direction: Becher’s work from the mid-1980s distinguished between
104 See Section III C above.
105 David Sugarman, “Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind and the Making of the Textbook
Tradition”, in William Twining (ed.), Legal Theory and Common Law (Oxford 1986) 26, 31. See
also Dicey, above n. 40, at p. 18: the task of law professors is to set forth law as a coherent whole.
106 For the nature of doctrinal research see text accompanying n. 15, above.
107 See William T.S. Stallybrass, “Law in the Universities” (1948) 1 Journal of the Society of Public
Teachers of Law 157, 160 (advocating for a shift from “education for Law” to “education in
Law”).
108 See, e.g., C. M. Campbell and Paul Wiles, “The Study of Law in Society in Britain” (1975–76) 10
Law and Society Review 551; Roger Cotterrell, Law’s Community (Oxford 1995) 71–90 (on
sociology of law in Britain); Anthony Ogus, “Law and Economics in the United Kingdom: Past,
Present, and Future” (1995) 22 Journal of Law and Society 26.
109 David Sugarman, “Beyond ignorance and complacency: Robert Stevens’ journey through
Lawyers and the Courts” (2009) 16 International Journal of the Legal Profession 7, 20.
110 McCrudden, above n. 7, at p. 642.; Twining, above n. 13, at p. 123. See also William Twining, Law
in Context: Enlarging a Discipline (Oxford 1997), 338–9: “legal scholarship today is generally more
varied, more lively, more sophisticated, and more self-confident (…) than fifty years ago”.
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convergent and divergent academic disciplines. A convergent discipline
has a “tightly knit community” whereas a divergent one tolerates
“a greater measure of intellectual deviance”. Law was seen as being in
the intermediate ground due to the divide between black letter law and
more contextual approaches.111 Cownie’s more recent research,112 as
well as our own pilot study at a medium-sized law school where none of
the three categories of this paper turned out to be dominant,113 reaches
similar conclusions. As for the future, there are concerns that university
legal education and scholarship may be “transformed into an industry
preoccupied with economic rationalism, efficiency and the generation
of income”.114 In addition, it needs to be discussed whether and how
foreign models of legal scholarship may have an impact, which we will
do in the next section.
C. Comparison with developments in the US and Germany
The ternary plot used in this section (Figure 4, below) illustrates how
legal thinking has evolved in the UK, the US and Germany. UK
developments were considered in the previous section: law started as a
practical discipline and moved then closer to other academic fields, first
humanities and subsequently the social sciences. Some of these trends
can also be found in the US and Germany but there are also important
differences.
The initial historical development of US legal thinking can be
regarded as similar to the UK one: starting from an affiliation with
legal practice, but subsequently influenced by humanities and social
sciences. Yet, throughout the 20th century the US has moved further in
the direction of social sciences, with the first main trends being legal
realism, law and society, but now predominantly law and economics
and empirical legal studies.115 These approaches have also had some
impact on UK legal scholarship, for instance, through academics
spending parts of their careers in the US.116 But differences remain:
for instance, Susan Bartie contends that today “the main point of
distinction is that in America there is a growing band of scholars who
proclaim that the discipline can abandon its link with the profession
and should boldly shape its interdisciplinary studies to meet broader
conceptions of the law”.117
111 Becher, above n. 11, at p. 156.
112 See Section A above.
113 The pilot study is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2097698.
114 Collier, above n. 55, at p. 534.
115 For an anthology see David Kennedy and William W. Fisher (eds.), The Canon of American Legal
Thought (Princeton 2006). See also Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer (Cambridge, Mass.
1993) and the references above n. 27–29 and 94–96.
116 See David Sugarman, “A special relationship? American influences on English legal education,
c. 1870–1965” (2011) 18 International Journal of the Legal Profession 7.
117 Bartie, above n. 10, at p. 367.
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Legal thinking in Germany offers a striking contrast. Starting with
the reception of Roman law, law was part of university-based teaching
and research. However, it was, and still is, also deeply practical,
with law professors having had an influence on both law-makers
and courts.118 Thus, for centuries law was firmly located in-between
practical legal research and humanities. To illustrate, Hermann
Kantorowicz’ famous manifesto on the “Struggle for Legal Science”
criticised in vain that the “dogmatic” nature of legal research in
Germany was similar to orthodox theology: accepting authority while
trying to develop a coherent normative structure.119 The emergence
of social sciences in the late 19th and 20th century had some impact
on legal thinking, in particular in constitutional, administrative
and competition law.120 Yet, in contrast to the US, changes have been
very modest, for instance, in terms of the limited impact of law and
economics.121
Figure 4: Illustration of Development of Legal Thinking in Three Countries
118 See, e.g., Stefan Vogenauer, “An Empire of Light? Learning and Lawmaking in the History of
German Law” [2005] Cambridge Law Journal 481; Michael Bohlander, “Radbruch Redux: The
Need for Revisiting the Conversation between Common and Civil Law at Root Level at the
Example of International Criminal Justice” (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 393,
405 (emphasising the similarity between academic and judicial methods in Germany).
119 Hermann Kantorowicz (Gnaeus Flavius), Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft (Baden-Baden
2002 [originally published 1906]).
120 See also Briggs, above n. 49, at p. 480 (Staatswissenschaft as including constitutional and public
law, political economy, administration and fiscal science).
121 See Martin Gelter and Kristoffel Grechenig, “The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought:
American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism” (2008) 31 Hastings International and
Comparative Law Review 295; Mathias Siems, “A World Without Law Professors” in Mark Van
Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research (Oxford 2011) 71.
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Comparing the UK with the US and Germany, one may wonder
how this is related to the “macro-level”, i.e. the structure of universities.
It was found above that in the UK, there is a trend to create faculties of
humanities and/or social sciences at the intermediate level combining
various schools, including law.122 Something similar is neither happen-
ing in the US, where law schools are separate postgraduate institutions,
nor in Germany where only few universities have multi-disciplinary
faculties.123 Yet in US law schools (but not in German law faculties),
interdisciplinary research has become the norm. Thus, it seems that the
creation of joined faculties may not matter that much for collaboration
across disciplines. Rather, with respect to the US, the fact that US law
professors tend to have one or more degrees in disciplines other than
law may well have played a role. This is rare in Germany and the UK
where, conversely, the academic staff of law schools tends to have
more extensive legal qualifications, be it at the professional level or a
doctorate in law.124
However, there is also an important difference between Anglo-Saxon
and continental European universities. In their comparative report on
disciplinary barriers between social sciences and humanities, Nicky Le
Feuvre and Milka Metso write about Anglo-Saxon universities:
In this model, the universities tend to be organised according to a
‘problem-solving’ logic. There is, in theory at least, quite a lot of
room for interdisciplinaity, since the expertise of the academic
community and its ability to communicate with a vast range of
social actors tends to be evaluated on the basis of their capacity
to address and, if possible, solve a certain number of ‘social
problems’.125
For UK law schools, and legal academics, the question may now be
whether to “go American” in moving closer to social sciences, or “go
German” in remaining closer to both humanities and legal practice.
The Europeanisation of legal education and research may point to the
direction of Germany; yet, realistically, legal thinking in most countries
is moving in the American direction.126 In terms of law’s evolution, this
122 See Section III A, above.
123 Few universities (e.g., Bonn) still have Faculties for Staatswissenschaften (see above n. 120), and
even fewer (e.g., Lu¨neburg) have Faculties for Social Sciences.
124 For the UK see Leighton et al., above n. 2, at pp. 19–20 (large-scale study found that in 1995
almost half of all law teachers, including university degrees and professional courses, has
significant experience of legal practice); SLSA discussion, (2011) 64 Socio-Legal Newsletter 4–5
(on the impact of the development of the PhD as an entry qualification on the type of legal
research carried out in law schools). Different still Becher, above n. 11, at p. 108 (in the early 1980s
in one of the leading law faculties only 5 out of 32 staff were Ph.D. graduates).
125 Nicky Le Feuvre and Milka Metso, Disciplinary Barriers between the Social Sciences and
Humanities, Comparative Report, The Impact of the Relationship between the State and the Higher
Education and Research Sectors on Interdisciplinarity in Eight European Countries, June 2005, 11.
126 See, e.g., Haim Sandberg “Legal Colonialism – Americanization of Legal Education in Israel”
(2010) 10/2 Global Jurist art. 6, available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol10/iss2/art6.
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may be the final paradigm shift: having started with a practical ap-
proach, and having “flirted” with humanities, the social sciences may
prove an eventual disciplinary consensus, turning law into a mature
science.127
However, one also needs to be aware of the implications of such a
development. The choice between one of the three approaches can be
thought as depending on the nature of one of three threats:128 if legal
scholars fear that academic legal research becomes irrelevant for law-
yers, they may want to return to practical legal studies; if they regard
current and past approaches as too sterile, they may favour a shift
towards humanities; and if legal research is felt to be not scientific
enough, empirical approaches of the social sciences seem to be the way
forward. Thus, individual legal researchers face the trilemma that
favouring any of the three approaches may lead to accusations of being
too impractical, shallow or unscientific.
It is also important to consider that the broad academic traditions
of humanities and social sciences have distinctly different ways of
thinking and reasoning. For instance, an analysis of textual practices
found that humanities scholars tend to emphasise individual varia-
tions, whereas social scientists aim for general explanations.129 There
are also differences in what is regarded as good and original research:
whereas humanities tend to value originality in approach and data,
social scientists care more about originality in method,130 often requir-
ing special skills and training.131 Thus, since moving ever closer to social
sciences would require adherence to this new and more uniform para-
digm, legal academics may well feel that they do not want to give up the
current pluralism to the way legal research is and can be conducted.
V. CONCLUSION
Most UK law schools have identified research as a key part of their
mission, recruiting and promoting staff with research performance as a
key criterion, and pointing to results of the past RAE (and in future the
REF) to demonstrate the success or status of the school. Universities
develop research at the level of the permanent academic staff but also
127 For the evolution of disciplines see Becher, above n. 11, at pp. 10, 21, 68. The original idea of
paradigm shift is Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 2nd ed. (Chicago 1970).
128 We thank Chris Hanretty for pointing us towards this problem.
129 See Susan Peck MacDonald, Professional Academic Writing in the Humanities and Social Sciences
(Carbondale, Ill. 1994). For law see Douglas M. Coulson, “Legal Writing and Disciplinary
Knowledge-Building: A Comparative Study” (2009) 6 Journal of the Association of Legal Writing
Directors 160.
130 See Joshua Guetzkow, Miche`le Lamont, and Gre´goire Mallard, “What is Originality in the
Humanities and the Social Sciences” (2004) 69 American Sociological Review 190 (based on
interviews).
131 For problems facing legal researchers see, e.g., Genn et al, above n. 76; Lee Epstein and Gary
King, “The Rules of Inference” (2002) 69 University of Chicago Law Review 1.
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through contract research staff and postgraduate research students,
and institutional arrangement such as research centres and research
support offices.
Yet legal research faces the challenge that its conceptual nature and
its position within the context of university disciplines are not entirely
clear: should law be thought of as a practical discipline, is it part of
humanities, or part of social sciences? In this article we have presented
a fresh picture of what legal research is (or could be), distinguishing
between “micro” and “macro” aspects, and discussing the relationship
between those. At the “micro-level”, the situation of current legal
research can be described as mixed since all three types are common
in UK academia, and often also within the research of individual aca-
demics. Thus, much appears to be left to personal choice. Normatively,
this can also be supported by the concept of academic freedom132 and
the apparent advantages of academic tolerance in allowing, or even
encouraging, plurality of methods.133
But adding the “macro-level” to the picture complicates the
position. Law is a discipline that does not fall squarely in a particular
category. This can have profound practical consequences. For in-
stance, a law-as-a-practical-discipline researcher may find it difficult to
convince the funding organisations of humanities and social sciences
(ie the AHRC and ESRC) that her research is worth pursuing. A law-
as-humanities researcher who is based at a faculty of law and business
may feel that her type of research is not duly appreciated, for instance,
in the making of decisions about promotion and REF submission. And
a law-as-social-sciences researcher based at a law school which is not
part of a faculty of social sciences may feel that she does not get ad-
equate the support, for instance, for fieldwork or statistical work, and
doctoral students with an interest in this approach may choose in-
stitutions where training in social science methods is readily available.
Of course, legal researchers can also shift between different types of
research. For example, someone whose research is both related to
humanities and social sciences may decide strategically whether the
AHRC or the ESRC provides more funding and higher success rates
for bids on research grants.134 Such a researcher may also want to know
more precisely which projects conducted by legal academics have
received funding in the past. Unfortunately, the current search tools of
132 Bradney, above n. 56, at pp. 123–6. See also Collier, above n. 55.
133 As explained in Siems, above n. 7, at p. 148.
134 See, e.g., the 2011/12 data of the AHRC and ESRC annual reports for research grants (including
early career, speculative and small research grants), available at http://www.esrc.ac.uk/
publications/annual-report/index.aspx (p. 35) and http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/News-and-Events/
Publications/Pages/Annual-report-and-accounts.aspx (p. 78): AHRC: 307 applications, 82 grants
awarded (i.e. success rate 27%); amount awarded circa £29.7m ESRC 779 applications, 108 grants
awarded (ie success rate 14%); total amount awarded circa £26.7m.
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the research council websites do not provide such information since it is
not possible to search according to departmental affiliation. However,
it is interesting to see that the Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills (BIS) has asked the research councils to develop a new web based
“Gateway to Research” that has the aim to provide “ready access to
Research Council funded research information and related data”.135
Having compared the UK with the US and Germany, we have also
seen that the preferences of individual researchers may well diverge
from university structures. This section of our article has also shown
that law as an academic tradition has been constantly evolving. At the
moment, legal research in the UK may still be in a transitional phase,
with some trend to move further to a social science model dominant in
the US. What is more, the world of universities is changing with higher
education and research increasingly becoming globalised and com-
mercialised.136 It can be expected that developments in this area will also
have an impact on both the “macro” and the “micro” level of legal
research, though in which precise direction legal research is to evolve
remains to be seen.
135 See http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/research/Pages/gtr.aspx. An example of this data can be found (for
selected ‘subject areas’ such as regenerative medicine) at http://bis.clients.talis.com
136 Becher and Trowler, above n. 89, at pp. 8–9.
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